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Abstract 
In light of the policy debate on too-big-to-fail we investigate evidence of economies of scale for 103 
European listed banks over 2000 to 2011. Using the Stochastic Frontier Approach, the results show 
that economies of scale are widespread across different size classes of banks and are especially large 
for the biggest banks. At the country level, banks operating in the smallest financial systems and the 
countries most affected by the financial crises realize the lowest scale economies (including 
diseconomies) due to the reduction in production capacity. As for the determinants of scale 
economies, these mainly emanate from banks oriented towards investment banking, with higher 
liquidity, lower Tier 1 capital, those that contributed less to systemic risk during the crises, and those 
with too-big-to-fail status.  
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1. Introduction 
Post-crises, the costs associated with ‘too-big-to-fail’ bailouts  have heightened the policy debate 
concerning the role and benefits of bank size and the influence of public safety net subsidies that 
accrue with both size and complexity  (Schmid and Walter, 2009; Stern and Feldman, 2009; Veronesi 
and Zingales, 2010; Wilson et al. 2010; Inanoglu et al. 2012; DeYoung, 2013; and DeYoung and 
Jiang, 2013).1 Safety net subsidies are centered on the view that governments provide implicit 
support because the failure of a large institution could have major systemic implications for the 
economy.2  State financed bank bailouts that occurred in the second half of 2008 illustrated evidence 
of such safety nets (Molyneux et al 2014).  As a response, regulators in the US (under the Dodd 
Frank Act of 2010) and in the EU (as in recommendations by the Liikanen Report 2012 being 
implemented into EC law as well as by the Vickers Report 2011 implemented into UK law) have 
sought to impose restrictions on banks by asking for more capital and liquidity (in-line with Basel 3 
requirements)3 and also to restrict riskier areas of activity4 – all of which constrains bank’s size.  
The motivation for these policy actions has been to reduce the negative consequences associated 
with the failure of systemically important banks, but as DeYoung and Jiang (2013) have argued, the 
policy debate has largely ignored the fact that large banks can also create positive externalities. 
Limiting the size of big banks could result in a net social loss if the restrictions inhibit bank’s ability 
                                                          
1 For European banks, when we refer to ‘post-crises’ we are referring to both the global financial crisis of 2007-08 and 
the European sovereign debt crisis of 2010-11. The starting date of the global financial crisis is defined according the 
definition of the Bank for International Settlements (2010) as August 2007. Therefore ‘pre-crisis’ is before 2007 and 
‘post-crises’ after 2011. 
2 For a sample of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in nine EU economies between 1997 and 2007, Molyneux et al. 
(2014) find no evidence that gaining safety net subsidies leads to an increased interdependency over peer banks of the 
‘too systematically important to fail’ bank. An alternative view on the reasons why governments provide implicit support, 
as outlined in Inanoglu et al. (2012), is that the need for the government to impose restrictions on the size and scope of 
banks risks a reduction in the efficiency and competitiveness of the banking sector.  
3 The so-called break-up hypothesis requires to break-up TBTF banks (via gradual and partial liquidation) or to provide 
TBTF banks incentives to shrink (e.g., the US Vitter-Brown bill, under circulation in Congress, will require banks with 
more than $500 billion in assets to maintain a minimum of 15% equity-to-asset ratio instead of the current 8%). 
4 In this regard, the United States passed the Volcker rule (contained in the Dodd-Frank Act), the European Union the 
proposal on the structural reform of banks, the UK the 2013 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act, and Switzerland 
the 2011 TBTF Banking Act (for a detailed list of structural banking reforms and their cross-border implications see 
Financial Stability Board, 2014). Specifically in January 2014 the European Commission made a proposal for structural 
reform aimed at minimizing the risky activities of the EU’s 30 systemically important banks (European Commission, 
2014). Starting in 2017, the proposal bans proprietary trading for banks that are labeled by international regulators as too-
big-to-fail in the global economy, or whose activities surpass certain financial thresholds. The EU reform would apply in 
all 28 Member States. 
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to realize potential scale economies that can be passed onto bank customers in the form of more 
efficient intermediation and therefore lower prices. Social spillover costs associated with troubled 
banks are tangible, observable, and happen in conjunction over relatively short timeframes; whereas 
the benefits associated with more efficient intermediation tend to occur over time, are less tangible, 
and therefore are not completely observable –  as such, these benefits tend to be overlooked. 
The aim of this paper is to investigate evidence of scale economies for Europe’s listed banks and 
to examine whether different business models and risk-taking features influence the realisation of 
scale economies as this will inform contemporary policy debate on proposed regulatory reforms that 
are likely to inhibit bank size/growth. Using a sample of 103 European listed banks from the Stoxx 
600 Banks index over 2000 to 2011 we find that scale economies are widespread across different size 
classes of banks and especially for the largest (with total assets exceeding €550 billion). Furthermore, 
the realisation of  scale economies are less prevalent in  smallest financial systems (Belgium, Finland, 
and Iceland) and in countries most affected by financial crises (Belgium, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain). Banks more oriented towards investment banking appear to realise greater scale 
economies as do those with:  higher liquidity (but only up to a liquidity ratio of about 7.5%; a convex 
curve);  greater leverage (with lower Tier 1 capital); for those banks that contribute less to systemic 
risk, and those with too-big-to-fail status. (Granger causality tests suggest the existence of 
unidirectional causality for liquidity, Tier 1 capital, and systemic risk). 
Scale economies, therefore, appear prevalent at big banks and particularly for those involved in 
investment banking. As such, the EU plans to limit the activities of EU institutions (through, among 
other things, the proposed ban on proprietary trading) may limit bank’s ability to realize such scale 
economies. Tougher capital regulations appear likely to reduce cost economies in banking although 
the requirement to boost liquidity (up to a certain level) may have the opposite effects. While theory 
suggests that bank average costs curves are U-shaped and therefore exhausted at some point, 
empirical estimates of bank cost economies rarely finds such cost features. Traditionally the early 
European literature finds evidence of somewhat flattish cost curves (see Goddard et al., 2001) 
whereas more recent studies show positive economies of scale for all asset levels in Europe (Dijkstra 
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2013) and for small and especially large asset levels in the US.5 Our findings on scale economies in 
European banking, echo findings from the US that suggest that the round of regulatory reform aimed 
at curtailing bank size may yield second-best policy solutions (DeYoung and Jiang, 2013). 
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we present the motivation for this study in light of 
the literature on economies of scale. Section 3 offers a description of the methodology and the 
sample, and we discuss the empirical results and some robustness tests in section 4. Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Literature review  
The role of large banks and recent regulatory proposals has directed renewed attention to the issue of 
economies of scale in banking (Davies and Tracey, 2014; DeYoung and Jiang, 2013; Wheelock and 
Wilson, 2012; Inanoglu et al., 2012; Hughes and Mester, 2013; DeYoung, 2010; Mester, 2010). 
There is an extensive literature on economies of scale in banking that mainly focuses on the US (see 
the recent literature review by Gambacorta and van Rixtel 2013, where one study only is reported for 
Europe).
6
 In Europe, Vander Vennet (2002) detects the presence of economies of scale for smaller 
banks in 1995 and 1996, while he documents neither economies nor diseconomies of scale for 
universal banks and financial conglomerates.
 7
 Altunbas et al. (2001b), with reference to the period of 
1989 to 1997, report economies of scale in the order of 5–7% for small banks (with total assets under 
$200 million)  and medium sized banks (with total asset between $1 and $5 billion), whereas large 
                                                          
5 Recent US literature finds an inverted U-shape, that is large scale economies at small banks and even larger scale 
economies at large banks (see Mester 2010, Wheelock and Wilson 2012, and Hughes and Mester 2013 for discussion and 
evidence on US banks). 
6 As for the US, early studies that analyzed bank costs in the 1980s (documented in the review of Berger et al., 1993; also 
see Mitchell and Onvural, 1996; Berger and Humphrey, 1994; McAllister and McManus, 1993) find little evidence of 
scale economies for large banks, the main result being that they are prevalent in small banks although rather modest in 
magnitude. However, studies in the 1990s and 2000s (Hughes and Mester, 2013, 2014; Wheelock and Wilson, 2012; 
Feng and Serletis, 2010; Hughes et al., 2001; Wheelock and Wilson, 2001; Hughes and Mester, 1998; Hughes et al. 1996, 
2000), employing methodologies that take account risk in bank production features, tend to find evidence of significant 
scale economies, even for the largest banks. However, others find the opposite. Inanoglu et al. (2012) find decreasing 
returns for the top 50 US banks over 1990 to 2009 and Davies and Tracey (2014) find that when they control for too-big-
to-fail factors scale economies tend to disappear. As for Japan, empirical evidence is more limited and tends to find a 
prevalence of diseconomies of scale over the 1980s and 1990s, in line with the evidence on the United States in the 1980s 
(Altunbas et al., 2000; Tadesse, 2006).  
7 For Europe during the nineties, there are also single-country level studies. For Italian banks, Girardone et al. (2004) 
confirm the presence of economies of scale only for small banks, particularly mutual and credit cooperative banks. For 
German banks, Altunbas et al. (2001a) document widespread economies of scale for different types of bank ownership 
(state-owned banks, mutual and private-sector institutions). 
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banks tend to show diseconomies of scale or constant  returns. Mercieca et al. (2007), for small credit 
institutions (with total assets lower than about €450 million) over the period 1997-2003, provide 
circumstantial evidence for the presence of economies of scale (increasing size is positively related 
with risk–adjusted performance). Dijkstra (2013), for banks within the Eurozone over the period 
2002 and 2011, documents that scale economies are found to be positive and significant for all years 
and at all asset levels. When accounting for implicit too-big-to-fail subsidies, economies of scale 
remain positive during the crisis, but become negative outside the crisis.  
Prior studies also investigate determinants that might play a role in the realisation of economies of 
scale, either related to macroeconomic features or bank-specific variables. Bossone and Lee (2004) 
document that banks operating in larger financial markets generally enjoy greater economies of scale 
than those in smaller systems. Bertay et al. (2013), for publicly traded banks from 90 countries, find 
that banks with larger absolute size tend to be more profitable whilst those that are big relative to 
their domestic economies tend to be less profitable. Moreover, banks that are large in absolute size 
tend to earn a greater share of their income from noninterest sources, operate with higher leverage, 
and make extensive use of wholesale funding. In contrast, banks that are large relative to their 
domestic economies tend to have a concentration in lending and a greater dependence on deposit 
funding.  
In addition to economies of scale, banks’ business models have been driven by economies of 
scope and deregulation (as crystalized by Gambacorta and van Rixtel 2013). The trend of 
diversification adopted by most large global banks is associated with increased consolidation and 
concentration that results in fewer, larger and more complex conglomerates (Buch and DeLong, 
2010; Herring and Carmassi, 2010). Given the weak evidence on the importance of economies of 
scope (for Europe Baele et al. 2007 and Van Lelyveld et al. 2009 document a mixed effect, whilst 
Mercieca et al. 2007 find a negative effect), and the mixed evidence on the positive impact of 
economies of scale, the business model of large and complex global banks appears to be partly 
motivated by regulatory considerations. Empirical studies show significant benefits for banks that are 
potential TBTF candidates, suggesting the importance of TBTF status (Wilson et al. 2010; Molyneux 
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et al. 2014). Specifically, Molyneux et al. (2014), for bank M&As in nine EU economies between 
1997 and 2007, find that safety net benefits derived from M&As have a significantly positive 
association with rescue probability, suggesting significant moral hazard problems. Relatedly, for a 
sample of large and complex EU banking groups, IMF suggests that almost 80 percent of banks that 
received official support in 2008/2009 traded significantly more than average (Chow and Surti, 
2011).   
The structural bank regulation initiatives currently being considered or implemented (Vickers and 
Liikanen proposals, and Volcker rule) generally do not include explicit size restrictions, instead they 
aim to reduce product diversification opportunities (potential scope economies) and also attempt to 
reduce implicit TBTF subsidies. Intense regulatory discussions on the possible introduction of 
explicit bank size restrictions (in relation to the size of the financial system as a whole or relative to 
GDP) are on-going (see, for example, Hoenig, 2012; Tarullo, 2012; Fisher, 2013; Haldane, 2013). 
In short, traditionally the early literature finds that large European banks tend to show neither 
economies nor diseconomies of scale, whereas in recent years a small body of research evidence 
documents economies of scale for all asset levels. The opportunities for banks to exploit potential 
economies of scale in the future will however depend on structural reforms as well as restrictions on 
size imposed by other regulatory frameworks, such as the leverage rule in Basel III. Therefore, to fill 
the gap of evidence on economies of scale in  European banking over  recent years, as well as to  
inform the policy debate on  reforms that are likely to inhibit bank size/growth, this paper aims to 
investigate evidence of scale economies (for the largest banks) as well as to examine if different 
business models and risk-taking influence economies of scale.  
3. Methodology and data 
3.1 Economies of scale 
Economies of scale occur in the long run when unit costs decrease as production volume 
increases, or if a bank is able to reduce the average cost of production when increasing the level of 
output. The overall level of economies of scale (ES) is computed as  
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where there are economies of scale if ES is less than one, diseconomies of scale if ES is greater than 
one, and constant economies of scale if ES is equal to one. The degree of scale economies is 
computed by using the mean values of output variables, input prices, and equity capital. For the cost 
function estimation, we use a model of bank costs borrowed from Berger and Mester (2003), recently 
adopted by Hughes and Mester (2013) and Davies and Tracey (2014), that includes off-balance sheet 
outputs and equity capital as a netput. The details of the estimation are provided in the appendix.  
3.2 Determinants of economies of scale 
To extend the analysis in Bertay et al. (2013), we isolate the effects of diversification in the 
business model, risk-taking, and profitability on economies of scale. Whilst not measuring economies 
of scale, Bertay et al. (2013) focus on bank size (measured by a bank’s balance sheet assets and by 
balance sheet size relative to the GDP of the home country) and its determinants. 
We first perform a univariate quintile analysis of the relevant characteristics (bank business 
model, profitability of traditional banking activity, liquidity risk, credit risk, capital strength, and 
systemic risk) in relation to  economies of scale, and then we perform the following (bank) fixed-
effect OLS regression with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors:8 
𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐸𝐶_𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑅𝑠𝑞𝑖,𝑡 
       +𝛽5𝐿𝐿𝑃_𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟1𝑖,𝑡+𝛽7𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟1𝑠𝑞𝑖,𝑡+𝛽8𝑆𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘%𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.  (3) 
where: 
                                                          
8 The Haussmann test rejects the hypothesis of random-effect in favor of the alternative hypothesis of fixed-effect at the 
1% level in all the models of Eq. (3). 
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ESi,t = economies of scale for bank i at time t, measured via equation (2), where higher values 
indicate lower economies of scale 
SEC_TAi,t =  securities to total asset ratio for bank i at time t that is used as a proxy for the bank 
business model (i.e., higher values denote business models more oriented to investment banking 
activities rather than to commercial banking activities) 
NIMi,t =  net interest margin (measured as net interest income to total loans) for bank i at time t 
that is used as a proxy for the bank profitability on traditional lending activities  
LRi,t =  liquidity ratio (measured as liquid assets to total customer deposits) for bank i at time t; 
this is a deposit runoff ratio and looks at what percentage of customer deposits could be met if they 
were withdrawn suddenly and is used as a proxy for liquidity risk (i.e., higher values, lower liquidity 
risk) 
LRsqi,t = squared terms of the liquidity ratio for bank i at time t that is used to test the existence of 
a nonlinear relation between liquidity and economies of scale 
LLP_Loansi,t = loans loss provision to loans for bank i at time t that is used as a proxy for the 
credit risk (i.e., higher values, higher credit risk) 
Tier1i,t =  Tier 1 ratio (measured as shareholder funds plus perpetual noncumulative preference 
shares as a percentage of risk-weighted assets and off-balance sheet risks measured under the Basel 
rules) for bank i at time t that is used as a proxy for the bank’s capital strength 
Tier1sqi,t =  squared terms of Tier 1 for bank i at time t that is used to test the existence of a 
nonlinear relation between Tier 1 and economies of scale 
Srisk%i,t =  systemic risk for bank i at time t that represents the bank’s percentage of the financial 
sector capital shortfall. Banks with a high percentage of capital shortfall in a crisis are not only the 
biggest losers in a crisis but also are the biggest contributors to the crisis. We employ the measure 
defined by Acharya et al. (2012), computed weekly by V-Lab, where Srisk%i,t is the contribution to 
aggregate Srisk by any bank. To calculate systemic risk, the procedure first evaluates the losses that 
an equity holder would face if there is a crisis (i.e. whenever the broad index falls by 40% over the 
next six months). For crisis scenarios, the expected loss of equity value of firm i is called the Long 
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Run Marginal Expected Shortfall (LRMES), that is the average of the fractional returns of the firm’s 
equity. The capital shortfall can be directly computed by recognizing that the book value of debt 
remains relatively unchanged during this six-month period while equity values fall by LRMES.  
 The motivation for the choice of bank-level determinants is based on Bertay et al. (2013) who 
examine the following: share of bank income from noninterest sources, leverage, use of wholesale 
funding, concentration in lending, dependence on deposit funding and bank probability of default. 
Our aim is to extend the investigation of these determinants from (balance sheet and systemic) size to 
economies of scale. 
Finally, to take into account the importance of too-big-to-fail, in the base model we include the 
TBTF dummy variable and its interaction with Tier1.9 Specifically we perform the following 
random-effect OLS regression with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors:10 
𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐸𝐶_𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑅𝑠𝑞𝑖,𝑡 
       +𝛽5𝐿𝐿𝑃_𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟1𝑖,𝑡+𝛽7𝑇𝐵𝑇𝐹𝑖 +  𝛽8𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟1𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐵𝑇𝐹𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.  (4) 
where: 
TBTFi = dummy variable equal to 1 for Systemically Important Financial Institutions as defined 
by the Financial Stability Board. 
 
3.3 Sample and data set 
For our sample we focus on listed European banks. Our interest in European banks is threefold. 
First, there is a lack of recent evidence on economies of scale in European banking. Second, over the 
last two decades, national European banking industries have become increasingly integrated due to 
deregulation via the Second Banking Directive (1989), the creation of the single market in financial 
products (implementation of the Financial Services Action Plan from 1999 to 2004), the introduction 
                                                          
9 We would like to thank the referee for this suggestion. To avoid multicollinearity we exclude Srisk% due to correlation 
between TBTF and Srisk% equal to 0.8231 (significant at 1% level), as documented in Table 4, Panel B. 
10 The Haussmann test does not rejects the hypothesis of random-error in favor of the alternative hypothesis of fixed-
effect in Eq. (4). As a robustness test of the random effect OLS, we also run the OLS regression with heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors clustered by banks; results are confirmed. 
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of the Euro, and through a buoyant process of cross-border consolidation (see Molyneux and Wilson 
2007; Beccalli and Frantz, 2009). Third, in 2014 the European Commission passed a proposal for 
structural reform of EU banks restricting riskier  activities and therefore constraining bank growth 
and size (European Commission, 2014). 
The sample includes constituents of the Stoxx 600 Banks index (except for banks listed in 
Liechtenstein) from January 2000 to December 2011.11 The sample comprises the largest banks in 
terms of asset size; these are banks of primary interest from the point of view of economies of scale 
and consequently for policy makers in relation to too-big-to-fail issues. Moreover, these banks also 
fell under scrutiny of the ECB in its 2014 Comprehensive Assessment (comprising a supervisory risk 
assessment, an asset quality review and  stress tests) aimed at evaluating systemic bank resilience to 
future economic and other shocks. Data on the composition of the index are obtained from 
Datastream, on annual consolidated financial statements of banks  from Bankscope, and information 
on systemic risk are obtained from the V-Lab website. 
The sample consists of 103 banks (686 observations) operating in 17 European countries over the 
pre-crisis and crisis periods (where the crisis period here comprises two events: the 2007-08 global 
financial crisis and the 2010-11 European sovereign debt crisis). Table 1 reports the sample selection 
strategy, that is bank constituents of the Stoxx 600 Banks Index (115 banks), minus banks comprised 
in the index only in the first 2 quarters of year 2000 (5 banks), minus banks with missing financial 
data in Bankscope (3 banks), minus banks not available in Bankscope (4 banks) leaves us with a total 
of 103 banks. In case of mergers and acquisitions involving the constituents of the index, the original 
constituent is replaced by the new one (i.e. we use the consolidated financial statements of the bank 
resulting from the consolidation). Table 2 provides the number of banks within the sample per 
country and year as well as the sample representativeness (i.e. a proxy of how representative the 
sample is of the population of EU banks): the total assets of banks in the sample represents on 
average 62% of the total assets of all banks operating in the countries under analysis. Given our 
                                                          
11 The introduction of IFRS in 2005 may influence our results. As a robustness test, we re-estimated economies of scale 
excluding values for 2005 (results available from the authors on request). The correlation coefficient among economies of 
scale estimated with and without 2005 is above 0.95 (statistically significant at the 1% level), thus suggesting that the 
introduction of IFRS does not represent a major issue in our analysis. 
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interest in economies of scale, we provide evidence on different size classes according to five 
quintiles (smallest, small, medium, large, and largest banks). Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics 
on the total assets of the five quintiles for the entire period of observation. The total assets of the 
banks included in the sample range between €959 million and €2,586,701 million, and their within 
and between standard deviation are 220,531 and 451,391 respectively. Table 4 provides the 
descriptive statistics of the bank characteristics (bank business model, profitability of traditional 
banking activity, liquidity risk, credit risk, capital strength, and systemic risk) and correlations. Over 
the study period, the securities to total asset ratio has a mean value of 0.264 (with a minimum of 
0.0024 and a maximum of 0.8337), that indicates that the sample  includes the biggest banks but they 
are not necessarily investment banks. Moreover, the securities to total assets ratio shows the highest 
correlation with scale economies (0.4277 significant at 1 percent level). Finally, securities to total 
assets and systemic risk and too-big-to-fail show very high correlations (above 60%): by introducing 
these variables together in a single model, the estimated coefficients could be bias and therefore 
interpretation of these particular coefficients should be done with caution (see fn 14 for a detail 
discussion).  
4. Results 
A graphical analysis of economies of scale in European banking (Figure 1) illustrates a 
widespread presence of economies of scale (values less than one). The figure also shows an 
interesting trend of moving together over time for all size classes (the within and between standard 
deviation for scale economies are respectively 0.0714 and 0.1656), although the largest scale 
economies are observed for the biggest banks. Although in theory bank average costs curves are U-
shaped and therefore exhausted at some point, empirical estimates of bank cost economies rarely find 
such cost features; recent studies find positive economies of scale at all asset levels in Europe 
(Dijkstra 2013) and positive scale economies at the smallest and largest asset sizes in the US (Hughes 
and Mester 2013). Moreover, we find a reduction in scale economies up to 2008 and an increase in 
the years 2009 to 2011 (with a marginal slowdown in 2011). Furthermore, small and medium-sized 
12 
 
banks (quintiles 2 and 3) experience the lowest economies of scale and even diseconomies of scale 
(values higher than one) in some years.  
Table 5 reports the average values of economies of scale and their relative statistical significance 
in each year between 2000 and 2011 as well as for each size class. The table confirms that economies 
of scale - rather than diseconomies of scale - are prevalent in European banking showing an average 
value of  around 14% (1 minus 0.8629) -  a 100% increase in output quantities increases total cost on 
average by 86%. Moreover, an analysis of the results for the quintiles discloses that higher economies 
of scale are realized both for the smallest banks (with total assets between €959 million and €28.326 
million), large banks (with total assets between €182.174 and €552.738 billion), and particularly for 
the biggest banks (with total asset between €552.738 and €258.670 billion). Among listed banks, 
small and medium-sized banks show lower economies and even diseconomies of scale. This evidence 
differs from that documented for European banks during the nineties, where diseconomies of scale 
were typically found for the biggest banks (Altunbas et al., 2001b; Vennet 2002). On the other hand, 
our findings are similar to recent U.S. studies that typically find evidence of significant economies of 
scale for the largest banks (Hughes et al. 1996, 2000; Hughes et al. 2001; Feng and Serletis, 2010; 
Wheelock and Wilson, 2012; Hughes and Mester 2013). Our evidence on the presence of economies 
of scale, especially for the largest banks, provides little support (from an efficiency standpoint at 
least) for restricting bank size. 
Table 6 reports average economies of scale for each country and for different size classes of 
banks. With reference to all the listed banks, regardless of size, three banking systems (Belgium, 
Finland and Iceland) show overall diseconomies of scale.12 Meanwhile in the other European 
countries, large significant economies of scale are reported (in particular for banks in the Netherlands 
and Switzerland). When we combine country and bank size, we observe that diseconomies of scale 
are experienced by the smallest banks in Finland, Germany, Ireland, and Spain; small banks in 
Finland, Germany, the UK, Iceland, and Portugal; and medium-sized banks in Belgium and the UK. 
Large banks exhibit diseconomies of scale in Ireland only, whereas the largest banks show 
                                                          
12 It should be noted that the same evidence for Finland was already documented in the 1990s (Altunbas et al., 2001b). 
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diseconomies of scale in Belgium only. It appears that the large banks only experience diseconomies 
of scale when operating in small banking systems and/or in countries most heavily affected by the 
crises (Belgium and Ireland).13 
Overall, the smallest financial systems (Belgium, Finland, and Iceland) and the countries most 
affected by the financial crises (Belgium, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) experience 
the lowest economies of scale (even diseconomies of scale) due to the reduced level of production 
capacity. There also seems to be  an  effect of the financial system as well as its size also appears to 
influence the bank level scale economies. Interestingly, the number of banks operating in countries 
most affected by the financial crises is substantial (about 20% of the overall sample) and these belong 
to the upper side of the size range (they represent about 32% of the biggest banks in Europe, 
respectively 20% and 12% of the large and largest quintile). Also, in small financial systems the 
biggest banks are not necessarily small on a European basis (in contrast to Finland and Iceland, 80% 
of the Belgian banks are above median size). 
Table 7 shows the average values of economies of scale for each country and in each year under 
analysis. Diseconomies are more pronounced during the global financial crisis. In 2007, the number 
of countries that experience diseconomies of scale (Finland, Ireland, Iceland and Spain) increases; 
but especially in 2008, the number of countries that encountered diseconomies (Belgium, Finland, 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) increases. This evidence confirms, as expected, that the scale of 
European banks, when volumes decline, becomes excessive and inefficient due to excess capacity. 
In order to investigate bank characteristics that determine economies of scale, we perform a 
univariate quintile analysis on bank characteristics (reflecting business models, risk, profitability and 
capital strength). Scale economies for five quintiles representing bank business models (namely, 
more oriented to investment banking versus more oriented to traditional commercial banking) are 
                                                          
13 The countries most affected by the 2007-08 global financial crisis are identified according to the national rescue 
measures taken by EU Member States from October 2008 through June 2009 to counter the immediate effects of the 
crisis. In this regard, we refer to ECB research (Petrovic and Tusch, 2009), that provides the list of countries with the 
most and/or largest government guarantee measures and recapitalizations. The countries most affected by the 2010 
European sovereign debt crisis are identified according to sovereign credit risk proxied by country-specific credit rating 
information. In this regard, we refer to ECB research (De Santis, 2012), that documents that country-specific credit 
ratings played a key role in the developments of the spreads for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
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shown in Table 8 (Panel A). The first quintile refers to the bottom 20% of the values in terms of 
securities to total assets, whereas the fifth quintile is the top 20%. We define as mainly investment 
banks those with higher values of securities to total assets (and consequently lower loans to total 
assets) and as mainly commercial banks those with lower values of securities to total assets (and 
consequently higher loans to total asset). Several interesting patterns emerge. First, mainly 
commercial banks show constant economies of scale during the dot-com crisis (2001–2002) and 
realise significant diseconomies of scale during the global financial crisis (2007–2008). Second, 
mainly investment banks realise high and significant economies of scale, especially during the 
financial crises. Banks more oriented towards investment banking experience a sharp reduction in 
asset values during the crises, and therefore an increase in their asset size might enable them to 
optimize their cost structure. This preliminary evidence seems to question the approach of EU 
regulator to address too-big-to-fail issues by banning proprietary trading. This policy choice could 
ignore the possibility that more diversified banks generate positive externalities and therefore may 
limit bank’s ability to realize scale economies. The quintiles that reflect the profitability of core 
lending activities (Net Interest Margin, NIM) and  related scale economies (Table 8, Panel B) show 
that banks with greater profitability (fourth and fifth quintiles) tend to experience larger economies of 
scale, whereas banks with lower profitability (first and second quintile) tend to enjoy lower 
economies.  The quintiles that reflect liquidity risk (Liquidity Ratio, LR) and related economies of 
scale (Table 8, Panel C) show that the banks with greater liquidity (fourth and fifth quintile) 
experience  larger  scale economies, whereas  banks with lower liquidity ratios (first and second 
quintile) experience on average minor economies  or even diseconomies  during the global financial 
crisis. Banks with higher liquidity are in a better position to develop future investments and activities 
and more able to exploit economies of scale whereas during the crises banks with less liquidity had to 
reduce their assets in the presence of the same cost structures that then resulted in diseconomies. This 
finding support Basel 3 requirements aimed at boosting liquidity, such regulation appears likely to 
increase cost economies in banking. The quintiles on credit risk (loan loss provisions over gross 
loans, LLP_Loans) and the related economies of scale (Table 8, Panel D) seem to suggest that credit 
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risk does not determine the differences across banks in terms of  economies of scale. The quintiles on 
capital strength relative to risk-weighted assets (Tier 1 ratio) and the related scale economies (Table 
8, Panel E) show that banks with the highest capitalization only appear to enjoy substantial 
economies of scale. Greater capital strength can either be interpreted as a proxy for lower risk 
(Mester, 1996) or as an indicator for the greater managerial flexibility in pursuing new business 
opportunities that can be financed via equity capital. Across the other four quintiles, there is no 
difference in the level of economies of scale. Finally, quintiles that reflect systemic risk (Srisk%) and 
related economies (Table 8, Panel F) show that  banks that contribute less to systemic risk (first 
quintile) do not appear to benefit from economies (they even experience diseconomies)  before the 
crises (caution should be taken here as the number of observations is only 53 before the crises). 
Conversely, during the crises, banks seem to benefit from economies of scale across all five quintiles 
(i.e., irrespective of their systemic risk), although banks contributing more to systemic risk (fourth 
and fifth quintile) seem to benefit from realizing the largest scale economies. This finding suggests 
that during the crises banks benefited from scale expansion independently of their contribution to 
systemic risk. 
To isolate the effects of diversification in the business model, risk-taking, profitability, and too-
big-to-fail status on economies of scale, we perform a multivariate analysis by using OLS regressions 
with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors as specified in equations 3 and 4 (Table 9: Panel A 
for the base model, Panel B for the reduced model with only significant variables in the base model, 
Panel C for the reduced model with systemic risk, and Panel D for the base model with the too-big-
to-fail status).14 Several interesting results emerge on the relation between economies of scale and 
key bank business characteristics. First, there is a positive significant link between investment 
                                                          
14 As for multicollinearity, no obvious problems affect the base and reduced models of Eq. 3 (highest VIF index is equal 
to 9.13 in the base model and to 8.11 in the reduced model), whereas the inclusion of systemic risk in the base model 
generates multicollinearity problems (highest VIF equal to 19.26). Thus, we choose to include systemic risk in the 
reduced model only (highest VIF index is equal to 8.72). The model with the too-big-to-fail status and its interaction with 
Tier1 (Eq. 4) could be affected by multicollinearity problems (highest VIF equal to 12.85). We thus check how stable 
coefficients are in the different models (Eq. 4 vs. Eq. 3). Given that coefficients are stable, multicollinearity should not be 
a problem. As for the R-squared, we note that it is not particularly high in most estimations. However we have already 
included the relevant characteristics identified in the literature (bank business model, profitability of traditional banking 
activity, liquidity risk, credit risk, capital strength, too-big-to-fail and systemic risk), and no other obvious variable (not 
correlated with the existing variables) seem to be available. 
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banking activity (SEC_TA) and economies of scale; in fact a greater emphasis of bank activity 
towards investment banking is associated with larger economies of scale. A Chow test shows a 
significant difference in the relevance of this determinant before and during the crises: mainly 
investment banks (i.e., banks with more proprietary trading) experience an increase in the magnitude 
of their economies of scale during the financial crises. This result confirms the evidence at the 
univariate level that banks more oriented towards investment banking could benefit most from 
economies of scale. This evidence is especially interesting in light of the 2014 European Commission 
proposal to ban proprietary trading for the largest banks as our findings suggest that such a move 
could limit positive efficiency externalities resulting in a net social loss. Second, the coefficient of 
profitability on traditional lending activities (NIM) is not statistically significant, which suggests that 
greater profits from traditional lending do not determine scale economies. However, the Chow test 
suggests a change in the impact of profitability on traditional lending activities before and during the 
crises. Third, there is a positive relation between the liquidity ratio and economies of scale (i.e., 
higher liquidity ratio, lower liquidity risk results in greater economies). To further investigate the 
effect of liquidity risk on scale economies, we analyze the squared value of the liquidity ratio. The 
coefficient of the squared term is positive suggesting that the relation is convex. This convexity 
means that for liquidity ratios up to 7.50% (where this minimum value is computed as -β3/2β4 as 
defined in Eq. 3) liquidity increases economies of scale, whereas above this level it reduces 
economies. The negative effect of liquidity above such a value suggests that above certain levels 
liquidity becomes an index of managerial inefficiency and/or lack of business investment decisions 
(that has a negative effect on cost efficiency). It follows that tougher Basel 3 liquidity requirements 
(up to a certain liquidity level) may have a positive effect on cost economies. Fourth, credit risk 
(LLP_Loans) has a non-significant impact on economies of scale, even during the crises. Fifth, over 
the entire period and during the crises, the capital strength (Tier1) coefficient is positive and 
significant whereas its squared value is negative and significant but close to zero. This evidence 
implies a concave relation, although almost flat, between Tier 1 and the economies of scale - this 
suggests that capital strength reduces economies of scale. Tougher Basel 3 capital requirement 
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appears to reduce cost economies in banking. Note however the relation between capital strength and 
economies of scale was non-significant before the crises. Sixth, in the reduced model with systemic 
risk (Table 9, Panel C), the systemic risk (Srisk%) coefficient is positive and statistically significant 
that means higher systemic risk reduces economies of scale. The result on systemic risk suggests that 
banks that could benefit most from size increases are ones contributing least to systemic risk: this 
evidence does not support the existence of a positive link between the too-big-to-fail issue and 
systemic risk. The need for the break-up hypothesis does not seem to be confirmed. Finally, in the 
base model with a dummy variable for TBTF (Table 9, Panel D), there is a positive and significant 
link between the too-big-to-fail status and economies of scale. Moreover for the base group of non-
TBTF banks capital strength increases scale economies, whilst for the TBTF banks it seems that 
capital strength decreases economies of scale. This suggests that tougher capital requirements appear 
to reduce cost economies specifically for too-big-to-fail banks, but not for other banks. Again the 
need for bank break-up’s (as illustrated in the US Vitter-Brown bill) does not seem to be confirmed 
for our European sample. 
4.1 Robustness tests 
Table 10 reports the results of the Granger causality tests (Granger and Newbold, 1986). In all 
specifications (Panels A to D), the first and second lags of  economies of scale are usually 
significantly different from zero indicating that scale economies at time t are influenced by the 
previous years' economies. When economies of scale are estimated as a function of lagged economies 
of scale and lagged Tier 1 capital (Panel A), we find that an increase in the second lag of Tier 1 
capital Granger-causes a fall in scale economies (Granger coefficient significant at the 1% level).15 
As for causality running from economies of scale to Tier 1, the significance of the coefficients for the 
first lag of Tier 1 suggest that it is affected significantly only by the previous years' Tier1, whilst 
Granger causality running from the economies of scale to Tier 1 is not statistically significant (p-
                                                          
15 Granger causality is assessed as the joint test of the two lags of Tier 1 on economies of scale as follows: β1 + β2 =0. A 
p-value less than 0.10 rejects the null hypothesis of no causality at the 10% significance level. However it is not possible 
to infer the stability of the relation over the long run. 
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value > 0.10). When economies are estimated as a function of the lagged economies of scale and 
liquidity ratio (Panel B), we document that an increase in the second lag of the liquidity ratio 
Granger-causes an increase in scale economies (Granger coefficient significant at the 10% level). As 
for the causality running from economies of scale to the liquidity ratio, liquidity ratio is affected 
significantly by the previous years' liquidity ratios and by the previous years’ economies of scale. 
Nevertheless, Granger causality running from economies of scale to the liquidity ratio is not 
statistically significant. When economies of scale are estimated as a function of lagged economies of 
scale and lagged investment banking activity (Panel C), we find that an increase in the second lag of 
the investment banking activity Granger-causes an increase in economies of scale (Granger 
coefficient significant at the 1% level). As for the causality running from economies of scale to 
investment banking activity, the latter is significantly influenced by the previous years' SEC_TAs and 
by economies of scale two years prior. Furthermore, Granger causality running from scale economies 
of scale to SEC_TA is statistically significant. Finally, when economies of scale are estimated as a 
function of the lagged economies of scale and lagged systemic risk (Panel D), we document that an 
increase in the first lag of systemic risk Granger-causes a decrease in the economies of scale 
(Granger coefficient significant at the 1% level). As for the causality running from the economies of 
scale to Srisk%, systemic risk is affected significantly only by the previous years’ Srisk%s. 
Nevertheless, Granger causality running from economies of scale to the Srisk% is not statistically 
significant.  
In short, Granger causality tests suggest the existence of a unidirectional causality running from 
liquidity, Tier 1 capital  and  systemic risk to scale economies. The null hypothesis of noncausality 
(economies of scale do not cause liquidity, Tier 1 capital, and systemic risk) can be rejected at the 1% 
level. In contrast, the null hypothesis that economies of scale do not cause diversification in the 
business model cannot be rejected at the 1% level. 
We further check the robustness of the results by using the Generalized Methods of Moments 
(GMM) introduced by Hansen (1982) as an alternative estimation strategy. The instrument variable 
set contains the lagged (one- and two-quarter) values of the log-difference of the respective 
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explanatory variables. For each of these instruments to be valid, they must be correlated with the 
endogenous variable and uncorrelated with the error term. A Hansen-Sargan test of the instrument 
validity is conducted. The rejection of the null hypothesis points to the validity of the instrument set 
we use. Table 11 shows the results obtained for the base model, the reduced model that includes 
systemic risk, and the base model that includes the too-big-to-fail status. Our previous results are 
confirmed. 
5. Conclusions  
To deal with moral hazard and government safety net subsidy issues linked to too-big-to-fail  bank 
regulators in the US and Europe have proposed structural reforms aimed at restricting bank risk-
taking – these reforms are likely to inhibit  bank growth and  size. Such legislation, therefore, could 
inhibit bank’s ability to realize scale economies, and this could feed through into higher costs and 
other externalities. In order to investigate such issues this paper uses a sample of 103 European listed 
banks over the period 2000 to 2011 to analyze scale economies and its determinants. We find that 
scale economies are widespread across different size classes of banks. Second, these cost economies 
are significantly greater for the largest banks. Third, the lowest economies are typically found in the 
smallest financial systems (Belgium, Finland, and Iceland). Fourth, banks that operate in countries 
most affected by the financial crises (Belgium, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) exhibit 
diseconomies of scale, probably due to reduced production capacity. Finally, as for the determinants 
of  scale economies, higher economies are realized  for banks with business models more oriented 
towards investment banking, with higher liquidity, lower Tier 1 capital, that  contribute less to overall 
systemic risk, and with the too-big-to-fail status. Granger causality tests suggest the existence of  
unidirectional causality running from  liquidity, Tier 1 capital, and bank’s contribution to systemic 
risk through to economies of scale. 
Over 2000 to 2011 the European banking industry exhibited significant economies of scale for the 
largest banks. As bank scale is associated with greater cost efficiency, this at least provides some 
justification as to why bank growth and greater size were strategically prioritised. Second, our 
20 
 
evidence illustrates that greater economies are realized for banks that emphasize investment banking. 
The evidence does not seem to support EU structural reforms that seek to limit big bank trading and 
other activities.  
Overall, these results suggest that the answer to our main research question is that European banks 
are not too big (as far as economies of scale are concerned). Nevertheless, we acknowledge the need 
for EU policy makers to balance the benefits of an efficient banking industry (or the costs of an 
inefficient one) with the costs of a riskier environment. Should these results remain robust in 
additional testing (e.g. different estimation techniques, alternative assumptions about the underlying 
bank production function such as the use of methodologies that take account risk) then their 
implications are potentially far-reaching. 
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Table 1: Sample selection 
   
 
 
Number of banks 
Banks comprised in the Stoxx 600 Banks Index (located in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland,  Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  UK. 
(period 2000 – 2011) 
 
115 
Minus  
- Banks listed in the Euro Stoxx 600 Banks Index only in the first 2 quarters of 
year 2000  
(Banco Portugues Do Atlantico,  Bank International Settlements Biz USA, 
Ionian Bank,   National Westminster Bank, Unidanmark)  
(5) 
- Banks with missing financial data in Bankscope  
              (Ageas NV, Glitnir Bank, National Bank of Iceland Ltd) 
(3) 
- Banks not available in Bankscope  
(BA Holding, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Banco Pastor,  KBC Ancora) 
(4) 
  
  
Final bank sample  103 
 
Final bank year observations 686 
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Table 2: Number of banks in the sample (per year / country) 
This table provides the total number of bank year observations comprised in the final sample per country and year (2000-
2011). Sample representativeness indicates how representative the sample is of the population of EU banks in each year 
and over the entire period, and it is calculated as the ratio of total assets of banks in the sample over total assets of all 
banks operating in the countries under analysis. 
Country\Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Panel 
Austria 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 29 
Belgium 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 2 36 
Denmark 
    
2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 22 
Finland 
    
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 
France 
    
1 5 6 7 7 7 7 7 47 
Germany 4 4 4 4 4 5 6 6 6 5 5 5 58 
Greece 
    
6 6 7 6 6 6 6 4 47 
Iceland 
     
1 1 1 
    
3 
Ireland 
    
1 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 30 
Italy 6 5 3 1 2 16 18 14 13 13 13 13 117 
Netherlands 
    
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 
Norway 
 
1 1 
  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 16 
Portugal 
    
1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 22 
Spain 
    
5 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 49 
Sweden 
     
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 28 
Switzerland 4 5 6 6 6 7 7 7 8 8 7 7 78 
UK 
    
3 11 13 13 13 13 11 11 88 
Total number 18 19 18 15 39 82 90 86 84 81 79 75 686 
Sample 
representativeness 
60% 66% 68% 61% 54% 58% 64% 64% 62% 62% 61% 59% 62% 
 
Table 3: Bank size classes: descriptive statistics  
This table reports descriptive statistics on size (expressed in terms of total assets) for each quintile (from the smallest to 
the largest). N. indicates the number of bank year observation. Size values are expressed in thousands of Euro. 
  N. Mean St.dev Min Median Max 
Quintile 1 - Smallest 137 15,640,318 6,833,712 959,000 15,408,601 27,524,800 
Quintile 2 – Small 137 45,300,082 11,393,042 28,326,600 44,860,100 69,596,000 
Quintile 3 - Medium 137 116,645,227 31,331,246 70,920,500 120,733,486 181,703,200 
Quintile 4 – Large 137 326,783,594 116,338,187 182,174,000 288,551,000 541,968,767 
Quintile 5 – Largest 138 1,094,533,160 480,107,265 552,738,000 919,841,850 2,586,701,332 
Panel 686 320,909,853 460,188,470 959,000 120,733,486 2,586,701,332 
 
 
 
  
28 
 
Table 4: Bank characteristics: descriptive statistics and correlations  
This table reports variables used as proxies for the bank characteristics: a) SEC_TAi,t is the securities to total asset ratio, 
used as a proxy for the bank business model; b) NIMi,t is the net interest margin (i.e. net interest income to total loans), 
used as a proxy for the bank profitability on traditional lending activities; c) LRi,t is the liquidity ratio (i.e. liquid assets to 
total customer deposits), used as a deposit runoff ratio; d) LLP_Loansi,t is the loans loss provision to loans, used as a 
proxy for the credit risk; e) Tier1i,t is the Tier 1 ratio (i.e. shareholder funds plus perpetual noncumulative preference 
shares as a percentage of risk-weighted assets and off-balance sheet risks measured under the Basel rules), used as a 
proxy for the bank’s capital strength; f) Srisk%i,t is the systemic risk, used to represent the bank’s percentage of financial 
sector capital shortfall (updated weekly by V-Lab for 306 observations in our sample); g) TBTFi is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for Systemically Important Financial Institutions as defined by the Financial Stability Board. Values are 
reported for the overall period (2001-2011), pre-crisis (2001-2006) and crises (2007-2011). Panel A reports descriptive 
statistics for each bank characteristic, and Panel B Spearman correlations (2-tailed). ***  correlation significant at 1%. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Period Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
SEC_TA Overall 686 0.2640 0.1699 0.0024 0.8337 
 
Pre-crisis 281 0.2459 0.1496 0.0029 0.7988 
 
Crises 405 0.2765 0.1818 0.0024 0.8337 
NIM Overall 686 0.0361 0.0733 -0.0048 0.9456 
 
Pre-crisis 281 0.0409 0.1010 -0.0002 0.9456 
 
Crises 405 0.0327 0.0449 -0.0048 0.6383 
LR Overall 686 0.4784 0.6768 0.0265 9.0351 
 
Pre-crisis 281 0.4971 0.8296 0.0265 9.0351 
 
Crises 405 0.4654 0.5470 0.0340 7.1571 
LLP_Loans Overall 669 0.0893 2.0595 -0.0090 53.2711 
 
Pre-crisis 270 0.2090 3.2415 -0.0090 53.2711 
 
Crises 399 0.0084 0.0302 -0.0070 0.3655 
Tier1 Overall 608 9.9863 4.6128 -0.4000 50.1000 
 
Pre-crisis 244 10.9387 4.3979 -0.4000 39.8000 
 
Crises 364 9.3478 4.6491 3.4000 50.1000 
Srisk% Overall 306 2.0185 2.8658 0.0100 15.4200 
 
Pre-crisis 61 3.8207 3.9496 0.0300 15.4200 
 
Crises 245 1.5698 2.3272 0.0100 13.8200 
TBTF Overall 686 0.1924 0.3945 0 1 
 Pre-crisis 281 0.1708 0.3770 0 1 
 Crises 405 0.2074 0.4060 0 1 
Panel B: Correlations  
 
ES SEC_TA NIM LR LLP_Loans Tier1 Srisk%  TBTF 
ES 1 -0.4277*** -0.2701*** -0.3442*** 0.1639*** -0.1625*** -0.3770*** -0.3334*** 
  
     
     
SEC_TA 
 
1 0.0459 0.5909*** -0.1548*** 0.2936*** 0.6599*** 0.6394*** 
  
     
     
NIM 
  
1 0.0877** 0.2252*** 0.2404*** -0.0522 -0.0663 
  
     
     
LR 
   
1 -0.2578*** 0.2961*** 0.4777*** 0.5672*** 
  
     
     
LLP_Loans 
    
1 -0.0361 0.0102 0.0158 
  
     
     
Tier1           1 0.1952*** 0.3061*** 
         
Srisk%        1 0.8231*** 
         
TBTF        1 
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Table 5: Economies of scale for European banks according to size classes (2000-2011) 
This table reports economies of scale (ES) for each year (from 2000 to 2001) and each size class (from the smallest to the 
largest, as shown in Table 3). As in equation 1), 𝐸𝑆 =  ∑
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 , where TC is the actual cost of producing the 
average output bundle at the average input prices, equity capital and macroeconomic factors; Qi is the volume of output i. 
ES < 1 indicates increasing returns to scale (i.e. economies of scale); ES > 1 indicates decreasing returns to scale (i.e. 
diseconomies of scale); ES = 1 indicates constant returns to scale. Bold typeface for values significantly different from 
one at the 5% level. 
Years Smallest Small Medium Large Largest All 
2000 0.9252 1.0015 0.9608 0.9260 0.8940 0.9348 
2001 0.8611 0.9763 1.0170 0.9489 0.8855 0.9336 
2002 0.8082 0.9538 0.9594 0.8393 0.7975 0.8689 
2003 0.7048 0.9441 0.8329 0.8800 0.6591 0.8042 
2004 0.8207 0.8592 0.8690 0.8413 0.7583 0.8287 
2005 0.8459 0.9255 0.8991 0.8401 0.7910 0.8593 
2006 0.8459 0.9515 0.9366 0.8525 0.8223 0.8818 
2007 0.9047 1.0081 0.9874 0.8743 0.8473 0.9235 
2008 0.8822 1.0487 1.0096 0.8956 0.8656 0.9395 
2009 0.7555 0.9586 0.9220 0.7757 0.7453 0.8304 
2010 0.7474 0.8667 0.8360 0.7654 0.6855 0.7795 
2011 0.7819 0.9165 0.8578 0.7717 0.6971 0.8050 
Panel 0.8255 0.9510 0.9228 0.8351 0.7848 0.8629 
 
Table 6: Economies of scale for European banks (per country and size classes) 
This table reports economies of scale (ES, as in equation 1) for each country and for each size class (from the smallest to 
the largest, as shown in Table 3). ES < 1 indicates increasing returns to scale; ES > 1 indicates decreasing returns to scale; 
ES = 1 indicates constant returns to scale. Bold typeface for values significantly different from one at the 5% level.  
Country / Quintile Smallest Small Medium Large Largest All 
Austria 
 
0.8396 0.7978 0.8417 
 
0.8218 
Belgium 
 
0.9874 1.1327 0.8691 0.9712 0.9895 
Denmark 0.8063 0.8312 
 
0.9450 
 
0.8601 
Finland 1.1084 1.0814 
   
1.0949 
France 0.8818 0.9472 0.9332 0.7486 0.8363 0.8499 
Germany 1.1003 1.1943 0.9036 0.8123 0.8155 0.8642 
UK 0.7956 1.3014 1.1211 0.8335 0.7572 0.8606 
Greece 0.8674 0.9516 0.9331 
  
0.9276 
Ireland 1.1473 0.9015 0.8826 1.0697 
 
0.9598 
Iceland 
 
1.0958 
   
1.0958 
Italy 0.8462 0.8925 0.8666 0.8081 0.7508 0.8507 
Norway 
 
0.8713 0.9231 0.8567 
 
0.8773 
Netherlands 
  
0.6011 0.6411 0.7454 0.6963 
Portugal 
 
0.9992 0.8893 
  
0.9542 
Spain 1.1026 0.9584 0.8992 0.8057 0.8339 0.9106 
Sweden 
  
0.9160 0.8116 0.6666 0.8325 
Switzerland 0.7034 0.7565 
  
0.7055 0.7088 
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Table 7: Economies of scale for European banks (per country and year) 
This table reports economies of scale (ES, as in equation 1) for each country and for each year. ES < 1 indicates 
increasing returns to scale; ES > 1 indicates decreasing returns to scale; ES = 1 indicates constant returns to scale. Bold 
typeface for values significantly different from one at the 5% level.  
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 All 
Austria 0.9435 0.9015 0.8415 0.7883 0.8013 0.8028 0.8106 0.8398 0.8702 0.7933 0.7280 0.7327 0.8218 
Belgium 1.0133 1.0636 1.0072 0.9749 1.0417 0.9437 0.9556 0.9726 1.1947 0.9970 0.9446 0.7710 0.9895 
Denmark 
    
0.8631 0.8860 0.8860 0.9294 0.9472 0.8664 0.7475 0.7651 0.8601 
Finland 
    
1.0145 1.1212 1.1100 1.1877 1.1988 1.0675 1.0205 1.0390 1.0949 
France 
    
0.9445 0.8517 0.8766 0.9265 0.9494 0.8029 0.7505 0.7826 0.8499 
Germany 0.9511 0.9434 0.8832 0.8301 0.7954 0.8776 0.8968 0.8875 0.8870 0.8228 0.8025 0.7940 0.8642 
UK 
    
0.7242 0.8921 0.8909 0.9262 0.9163 0.8247 0.7779 0.8124 0.8606 
Greece 
    
0.8396 0.8646 0.8810 0.9520 1.0025 0.9491 0.9280 1.0536 0.9276 
Ireland 
    
1.0026 0.9621 1.0078 1.0317 1.0496 0.8707 0.8080 0.8332 0.9598 
Iceland 
     
1.0960 1.1168 1.0747 
    
1.0958 
Italy 0.9301 0.9384 0.9166 0.8734 0.8658 0.7987 0.8415 0.9032 0.9337 0.8213 0.7592 0.8188 0.8507 
Norway 
 
1.0751 1.0407 
  
0.8397 0.8869 0.9086 0.9413 0.7893 0.7997 0.7954 0.8773 
Netherlands 
    
0.7829 0.8064 0.6908 0.6950 0.7520 0.6411 0.5882 0.6139 0.6963 
Portugal 
    
0.8347 0.9308 0.9453 0.9945 1.0406 0.9537 0.9200 0.9344 0.9542 
Spain 
    
0.8307 0.9030 0.9637 1.0054 1.0156 0.8763 0.8147 0.8829 0.9106 
Sweden 
     
0.8355 0.8327 0.9072 0.9109 0.8012 0.7529 0.7870 0.8325 
Switzerland 0.8819 0.8534 0.7699 0.7237 0.7012 0.7165 0.7473 0.7763 0.7388 0.6295 0.5339 0.5648 0.7088 
 
Table 8: The determinants of economies of scale – univariate quintile analysis  
This table shows univariate quintile analysis by reporting economies of scale for five quintiles representing bank 
characteristics (as defined in Table 4), namely: a) bank business models (Securities/Total Assets, Panel A); b) 
profitability of the core lending activities (Net Interest Margin, Panel B);  c) liquidity risk (Liquidity Ratio, Panel C); d) 
credit risk (Loan Loss Provision/Gross Loans, Panel D); e)  capital strength relative to risk-weighted assets (Tier 1 ratio, 
Panel E); f) systemic risk (Srisk%, Panel F). Bold typeface for values significantly different from one at the 5% level.  
PANEL A 
 
Economies of scale on Securities /Total Asset (SEC_TA) quintiles 
Year Quintile 1 
(Lowest) 
Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
(Highest) 
Total 
2000 0.9566 0.9449 0.9536 0.8386 0.9045 0.9348 
2001 1.0595 0.9388 0.9132 0.8212 0.9301 0.9336 
2002 1.0002 0.9502 0.8095 0.7595 0.8181 0.8689 
2003 0.9792 0.8435 0.6726 0.7973 0.7283 0.8042 
2004 0.9349 0.8429 0.8514 0.8093 0.7079 0.8287 
2005 0.9415 0.8750 0.8600 0.8380 0.7817 0.8593 
2006 0.9621 0.9078 0.8667 0.8343 0.8380 0.8818 
2007 1.0198 0.9702 0.9224 0.8134 0.8934 0.9235 
2008 1.0177 1.0170 0.9304 0.9040 0.8281 0.9395 
2009 0.8657 0.9189 0.8493 0.8342 0.6923 0.8304 
2010 0.8133 0.9108 0.8085 0.6976 0.6692 0.7795 
2011 0.9156 0.9048 0.8186 0.7263 0.6598 0.8050 
All years 0.9555 0.9187 0.8547 0.8061 0.7876 0.8658 
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Panel B 
Economies of scale on Net Interest Margin (NIM) quintiles 
Year Quintile 1 
(Lowest) 
Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
(Highest) 
Total 
2000 0.8812 1.0180 0.9145 0.9246 0.8914 0.9348 
2001 0.9521 0.9380 0.9841 0.9295 0.8768 0.9336 
2002 0.9103 0.9434 0.9559 0.8195 0.7216 0.8689 
2003 0.8118 0.9072 0.8764 0.7973 0.6282 0.8042 
2004 0.9213 0.8536 0.8585 0.7583 0.7555 0.8287 
2005 0.9398 0.8713 0.8875 0.7977 0.7990 0.8593 
2006 0.9653 0.9303 0.8598 0.8404 0.8131 0.8818 
2007 0.9635 0.9872 0.9433 0.8615 0.8654 0.9235 
2008 0.9862 0.9662 0.9646 0.9164 0.8657 0.9395 
2009 0.9076 0.8677 0.8288 0.7721 0.7790 0.8304 
2010 0.9024 0.8139 0.7717 0.6412 0.7680 0.7795 
2011 0.9000 0.8601 0.7746 0.7509 0.7394 0.8050 
All years 0.9201 0.9131 0.8850 0.8174 0.7919 0.8658 
 
Panel C 
Economies of scale on Liquidity Ratio (LR) quintiles 
Year Quintile 1 
(Lowest) 
Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
(Highest) 
Total 
2000 1.0079 0.9408 0.9716 0.9618 0.8094 0.9348 
2001 1.0390 0.9927 0.9128 0.9595 0.7587 0.9336 
2002 0.9624 0.9535 0.9070 0.7459 0.7660 0.8689 
2003 0.8918 0.8544 0.8862 0.6392 0.7492 0.8042 
2004 0.8974 0.8276 0.8789 0.7377 0.8083 0.8287 
2005 0.9233 0.8510 0.8593 0.8396 0.8217 0.8593 
2006 0.9369 0.8847 0.8897 0.8287 0.8689 0.8818 
2007 1.0125 0.9349 0.8983 0.8463 0.9252 0.9235 
2008 0.9909 0.9808 0.9258 0.8492 0.9502 0.9395 
2009 0.8961 0.8525 0.8090 0.7563 0.8375 0.8304 
2010 0.8248 0.8225 0.7914 0.6995 0.7600 0.7795 
2011 0.8867 0.8603 0.7460 0.7062 0.8258 0.8050 
All years 0.9391 0.8963 0.8730 0.7975 0.8234 0.8658 
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Panel D 
Economies of scale on Loss Loan Provision/Gross Loans (LLP_Loans) quintiles 
Year Quintile 1 
(Lowest) 
Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
(Highest) 
Total 
2000 0.9227 0.9855 0.9824 0.8819 0.9361 0.9262 
2001 0.8785 0.9140 0.9954 0.9271 0.9015 0.9236 
2002 0.7551 0.9795 0.9030 0.8753 0.8181 0.8568 
2003 0.6084 0.8390 0.7889 0.8167 0.8800 0.7864 
2004 0.8226 0.8576 0.8249 0.8071 0.8188 0.8259 
2005 0.8249 0.9126 0.8332 0.8515 0.8641 0.8573 
2006 0.8442 0.9242 0.8531 0.9043 0.8623 0.8771 
2007 0.8729 0.9500 0.9582 0.9021 0.9196 0.9201 
2008 0.9518 0.9612 0.9297 0.8777 0.9509 0.9346 
2009 0.7787 0.8134 0.8437 0.8532 0.8529 0.8284 
2010 0.6825 0.7899 0.8202 0.7593 0.8421 0.7789 
2011 0.7012 0.8867 0.7913 0.7622 0.8813 0.8047 
All years 0.8036 0.9011 0.8770 0.8515 0.8773 0.8600 
 
       
Panel E 
Economies of scale on Tier 1 ratio (Tier1) quintiles 
Year 
Quintile 1 
Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 
Quintile 5 
Total 
(Lowest) (Highest) 
2000 0.8822 0.8734 0.9415 0.9485 0.828 0.9093 
2001 0.8556 0.9696 0.9805 0.9601 0.7391 0.9042 
2002 0.9506 0.8426 0.8415 0.9876 0.6599 0.8479 
2003 0.8393 0.7594 0.8498 0.6608 0.6806 0.7509 
2004 0.7652 0.8780 0.8482 0.7863 0.7003 0.7956 
2005 0.8479 0.8447 0.9232 0.8621 0.7918 0.8540 
2006 0.8927 0.8728 0.9256 0.9112 0.8094 0.8822 
2007 0.9075 0.9426 0.9779 0.9101 0.8643 0.9202 
2008 0.9511 0.9555 0.9481 0.9308 0.8582 0.9283 
2009 0.8975 0.8851 0.8132 0.847 0.675 0.8236 
2010 0.8010 0.8007 0.8200 0.7911 0.6129 0.7636 
2011 0.8883 0.8249 0.8047 0.7003 0.6947 0.7811 
All years 0.8733 0.8708 0.8895 0.858 0.7429 0.8467 
  
33 
 
Panel F 
Economies of scale on Systemic Risk % (Srisk%) quintiles 
Year 
Quintile 1 
Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 
Quintile 5 
Total 
(Lowest) (Highest) 
2000 0.8948 
 
1.0815 
 
0.9542 0.9348 
2001 0.7465 1.1130 
 
0.9213 0.9712 0.9336 
2002 1.0738 0.8468 0.6899 0.9346 0.6525 0.8689 
2003 1.0526 0.7991 0.6895 0.6320 0.8632 0.8042 
2004 0.8996 1.0725 0.7608 0.7491 0.8032 0.8287 
2005 0.9788 0.9791 0.8417 0.7974 0.7953 0.8593 
2006 1.0163 1.0275 0.8391 0.8328 0.8114 0.8818 
2007 0.9333 0.9518 0.9916 0.8721 0.8177 0.9235 
2008 0.9607 0.9893 0.9754 0.8861 0.8582 0.9395 
2009 0.8983 0.9406 0.8415 0.7443 0.7455 0.8304 
2010 0.8480 0.8924 0.8353 0.7181 0.7034 0.7795 
2011 0.7652 0.9327 0.9031 0.7403 0.6798 0.8050 
All years 0.9223 0.9586 0.8591 0.8026 0.8046 0.8658 
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Table 9: The determinants of economies of scale - OLS multivariate regressions 
This table reports the results on the determinants of economies of scale estimated by using multivariate OLS regressions as specified in equation 3 and 4 (Panel A for the base 
model as in equation 3, Panel B for the reduced model with only significant variables in the base model, Panel C for the reduced model with systemic risk, and Panel D for the 
base model with too-big-to-fail status as in equation 4). Based on the Haussmann test, we estimate the three models of equation 3 by using bank fixed-effect (Panels A-C), whilst 
we estimate equation 4 by using random-effect (Panel D). Overall refers to the entire period (2001-2011), pre-crisis to years 2001-2006, and crises to years 2007-11. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
PANEL A 
Eq. 3 - Base model 
PANEL B 
Eq. 3 - Reduced model  
PANEL C 
Eq. 3- Reduced model with Srisk% 
PANEL D 
Eq. 4 
Dep variable: ES Overall VIF Pre-crisis Crises 
Chow Pre 
vs. Post Overall VIF Pre-crisis Crises Overall VIF Crises Overall VIF Pre-crisis Crises 
SEC_TA -0.2259*** 1.77 -0.2243** -0.2412* 6.30** -0.2243*** 1.73 -0.2173** -0.2648** -0.1648 2.14 -0.1342 -0.2528*** 1.98 -0.1885*** -0.3555*** 
 
(0.0613)  (0.1036) (0.1309)  (0.0598)  (0.0926) (0.1227) (0.1159)  (0.2236) (0.0524)  (0.0680) (0.0690) 
NIM 0.5660 5.9 -0.3514 0.1920 3.36**        0.2868 5.93 -1.5455** -0.3393 
 
(0.6471)  (1.1171) (1.7179)         (0.5697)  (0.6590) (0.7817) 
LR -0.1120** 5.75 -0.1562 -0.1341 4.50*** -0.1073** 5.63 -0.1747 -0.1405* -0.0695 8.23 -0.0923 -0.0825** 5.91 -0.1033 -0.0466 
 
(0.0476)  (0.1457) (0.0859)  (0.0461)  (0.1358) (0.0850) (0.0551)  (0.0751) (0.0358)  (0.1052) (0.0498) 
LRsq 0.0075** 9.13 0.0674 0.0113 3.69*** 0.0091** 4.24 0.0647 0.0131* 0.0043 6.75 0.0059 0.0114 9.12 0.0615 0.0136 
 
(0.0037)  (0.0845) (0.0102)  (0.0038)  (0.0614) (0.0068) (0.0049)  (0.0073) (0.0075)  (0.0546) (0.0117) 
LLP_Loans 0.1296 2.25 0.1593 0.3953 3.19***        0.2392 2.25 0.1197 0.5206 
 
(0.1832)  (0.3715) (0.3189)         (0.2355)  (0.2949) (0.4462) 
Tier1 0.0066* 8.92 -0.0002 0.0155* 3.64*** 0.0069* 8.11 -0.0010 0.0151* 0.0672*** 8.72 0.0814 -0.0027 1.36 -0.0003 -0.0060** 
 
(0.0042)  (0.0056) (0.0094)  (0.0041)  (0.0050) (0.0091) (0.0219)  (0.0496) (0.0021)  (0.0027) (0.0025) 
Tier1sq -0.0002* 7.84 0.0001 -0.0003* 3.23*** -0.0002* 7.75 0.0001 -0.0003* -0.0028*** 8.00 -0.0035     
 
(0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0002)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0010)  (0.0027)     
TBTF             -0.1252* 12.85 -0.0603 -0.3702*** 
             (0.0669)  (0.0814) (0.0943) 
TBTF * Tier1             0.0113** 12.80 0.0035 0.0408*** 
             (0.0056)  (0.0061) (0.0105) 
Srisk%          0.0058*** 1.66 0.0159*     
 
         (0.0020)  (0.0094)     
Constant 0.8952***  0.9565*** 0.8539***  0.9081***  0.9581*** 0.8753*** 0.5775***  0.5122** 0.9768***  0.9832*** 1.0313*** 
 
(0.0473)  (0.0637) (0.1204)  (0.0286)  (0.0463) (0.0965) (0.1348)  (0.2287) (0.0306)  (0.0383) (0.0366) 
Observations 604  240 364  608  244 364 270  217 604  240 364 
R-squared (within) 0.0949  0.0967 0.0968  0.0919  0.998 0.0907 0.1885  0.1573 0.0842  0.0738 0.0949 
R-squared (between) 0.1195  0.0839 0.1022  0.0647  0.0725 0.0672 0.1667  0.1483 0.2442  0.1648 0.3969 
R-squared (overall) 0.1465  0.1740 0.1205  0.1456  0.1663 0.1083 0.0638  0.0528 0.2220  0.2419 0.3272 
Number of banks 95  89 84  95  89 84 59  59 95  89 84 
Fixed-effect YES  YES YES  YES  YES YES YES  YES NO  NO NO 
ALL Years YES  NO NO  YES  NO NO YES  NO YES  NO NO 
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0014 0.0015  0.0000  0.0005 0.0086 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 10: Does economies of scale Granger-cause Tier 1/liquidity ratio/ business model or vice versa? 
This table reports the results of the Granger causality tests. Economies of scale are estimated as a function of: a) lagged economies of scale and lagged Tier 1 capital (Panel A); b) 
lagged economies of scale and liquidity ratio (Panel B); c) lagged economies of scale and lagged investment banking activity (Panel C); d) lagged economies of scale and lagged 
systemic risk (Panel D). Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
PANEL A PANEL B PANEL C PANEL D 
VARIABLES ES Tier1 ES LR ES SEC_TA ES Srisk% 
L.Tier1 -0.0014 0.6737*** 
     
  
  (0.0033) (0.0582) 
     
  
L2.Tier1 0.0055** 0.0134 
     
  
  (0.0025) (0.0568) 
     
  
L.LR 
  
-0.0046 0.6316*** 
   
  
  
  
(0.0114) (0.0315) 
   
  
L2.LR 
  
-0.0164** -0.0127 
   
  
  
  
(0.0069) (-0.0191) 
   
  
L.SEC_TA 
    
-0.0750 0.6044*** 
 
  
  
    
(0.0549) (0.0475) 
 
  
L2.SEC_TA 
    
-0.1190** -0.0369 
 
  
  
    
(0.0553) (0.0478) 
 
  
L.Srisk% 
      
0.0167*** 0.3957*** 
  
      
(0.0056) (0.0734) 
L2.Srisk% 
      
-0.0004 0.0075 
  
      
(0.0043) (0.0572) 
L.ES 0.6750*** -2.2035 0.7282*** 0.2683** 0.6989*** -0.0141 0.5955*** 0.5972 
  (0.0492) (1.6462) (0.0464) (0.1278) (0.0471) (0.0408) (0.0825) (1.0983) 
L2.ES -0.5033*** -0.6072 -0.4868*** -0.3220** -0.4838*** 0.1260*** -0.3548*** -0.6983 
  (0.0567) (1.8871) (0.0535) (0.1475) (0.0532) (0.0460) (0.0876) (1.1739) 
Constant 0.6587*** 5.1532*** 0.6629*** 0.2262* 0.7267*** 0.0208 0.6037*** 1.3971 
  (0.0497) (1.6638) (0.0460) (0.1267) (0.0505) (0.0436) (0.0714) (0.9442) 
Observations 428 416 483 483 483 483 181 177 
Number of banks 84 82 92 92 92 92 52 52 
Fixed-effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.3973 0.3931 0.4018 0.5517 0.4085 0.3566 0.4064 0.2964 
Test of β1+β2=0 p-value 0.0096 0.1230 0.0504 0.7060 0.0006 0.0132 0.0007 0.9270 
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Table 11: The determinants of economies of scale – GMM multivariate regressions  
This table reports the results on the determinants of economies of scale estimated by using GMM multivariate regressions (Panel A for the base  model in the overall 
period, pre-crisis period and during the crises, Panel B for the reduced model with systemic risk in the overall period and during the crises, and Panel C for the base 
model with too-big-to-fail status in the overall period and during the crises). The instrument variable set contains the lagged (one- and two-quarter) values of the log-
difference of the respective explanatory variables. Overall refers to the entire period (2001-2011), pre-crisis to years 2001-2006, and crises to years 2007-11. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 PANEL A PANEL B PANEL C 
Dep variable: ES 
Overall Pre-crisis Crises Overall Crises Overall Crises 
    
    
SEC_TA -0.3681*** -0.1881*** -0.4184*** -0.3502*** -0.3757*** -0.3645*** -0.4270*** 
 
(0.0010) (0.0293) (0.0093) (0.0168) (0.0110) (0.0023) (0.0365) 
NIM  -2.5832*** -3.4879*** -3.286017   -2.7500*** -4.0523*** 
 
(0.0148) (0.0948) (0.0883)   (0.0285) (0.4270) 
LR  -0.0181*** -0.3849*** 0.0426593 -0.1130*** -0.0708*** -0.0134*** -0.1896*** 
 
(0.0015) (0.0198) (0.0055) (0.0076) (0.0040) (0.0014) (0.0371) 
LRsq 0.0375*** 0.1641*** 0.0383267 0.0268*** 0.0194*** 0.0412*** 0.1528*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0154) (0.0020) (0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0195) 
LLP_Loans  1.4915*** 0.4778** 1.5577***   1.2799*** 0.1679 
 (0.0272) (0.2077) (0.0886)   (0.0496) (0.6570) 
Tier1 0.0036*** 0.0079*** 0.0061536 0.0032*** 0.0200*** -0.0116*** -0.0104*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0024) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0008) 
Tier1sq -0.0003*** -0.0001 -0.0004205 -0.0002*** -0.0005***   
 
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)   
Srisk%    0.0112*** 0.0072***   
 
   (0.0007) (0.0004)   
TBTF      -0.2333*** -0.4830*** 
      (0.0027) (0.0628) 
TBTF*Tier1      0.0212*** 0.0551*** 
      (0.0002) (0.0070) 
Constant 1.0174*** 1.0254*** 1.013374 0.9634*** 0.8444*** 1.1342*** 1.2095*** 
 
(0.0033) (0.0183) (0.0125) (0.0098) (0.0091) (0.0014) (0.0162) 
      
  
Observations 604 240 364 270 230 604 364 
ALL Years YES NO NO YES NO YES NO 
Hansen's J (p-value) 0.398 0.115 0.153 0.458 0.339 0.343 0.0396 
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Figure 1: A graphical analysis 
The figure shows economies of scale for each size quintile (from the smallest to the largest, as identified in Table 3) and 
for all banks in the sample in each year over the period 2000-2011. 
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Appendix 
The overall level of economies of scale (ES) is computed as the sum of individual cost 
elasticities. To generate estimates of cost elasticities for each bank we use the standard Stochastic 
Frontier Approach (SFA) along the lines ﬁrst suggested by Aigner et al. (1977). Speciﬁcally, we use 
the Battese and Coelli (1992) model of a stochastic frontier function for panel data with ﬁrm eﬀects 
that are assumed to be distributed as truncated normal random variables (  0) and are also 
permitted to vary systematically over time (see for more details on the SFA methodology, Coelli et 
al., 1998). The standard translog functional form as well as a two-component error structure is 
estimated using a maximum likelihood procedure. 
This procedure is speciﬁed as follows: 
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         (A.1) 
The variable deﬁnitions are as follows: TC = total costs of production comprising operating costs 
and interest paid on deposits. Bank outputs (with 1.0 added to avoid taking the log of zero) are Q1= 
total loans; Q2= securities; and Q3= off-balance sheet output.16 Bank input prices for labor, loanable 
funds, and physical capital, respectively, are P1 personnel expenses/total assets; P2 = interest 
expenses/total funds; P3 = depreciation and other capital expenses/ﬁxed assets; equity capital (E) is 
                                                          
16 In our sample, bank/year observations with no off-balance sheet represent 22% of the total according to the data on 
annual financial statements obtained from Bankscope. As a further robustness test, we have re-estimated economies of 
scale excluding this output, and previous results are confirmed. These results are available from the authors on request. 
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included in the speciﬁcation to control for differences in bank risk preferences (Hughes and Mester, 
1993; Mester, 1996; Hughes and Mester, 2013; Davies and Tracey, 2014). Note that E is fully 
interactive with the output and the input price variables. Note also that we assume that factor input 
markets are competitive, and that government guarantees and recapitalizations (as detailed in fn 14) 
may have affected the cost of inputs and equity of the banks that received government help. All of 
the variables are deﬂated by using country speciﬁc GDP deﬂators with 2005 as a base year. Given 
the cross-country nature of our sample, we adopt a common frontier for the 17 industries that also 
includes the exogenous environmental variables (as in Battese and Coelli, 1992)17: economic 
freedom (EC_FREE) of the state in which each individual bank operates, the natural logarithm of 
the market capitalization to the gross domestic product (LNMARKET_CAP) of the state in which 
each individual bank operates, the annual performance of the equity market (PERF_EQ) of the 
country in which each individual bank operates, and the natural logarithm of the gross national 
income per capita (LNGNI_CAPITA) of the country in which each individual bank operates. The t 
is a linear time trend. The i is the two-component stochastic error term. The εi is the stochastic 
error term sum of two components iii
vu 
, while , , , , , , , , , , , ,              are the 
parameters to be estimated. 
About the deﬁnitions of input and output used in the function, we follow the traditional 
intermediation approach of Sealey and Lindley (1977) in which inputs (labor, physical capital, and 
deposits) are used to produce earning assets. Two of our outputs (loans and securities) are earnings 
assets, and we also include oﬀ-balance sheet items (comprising managed securitized assets reported 
off-balance sheet, other off-balance sheet exposure to securitization, guarantees, acceptance and 
                                                          
17 We are aware that the pooled frontier with environmental variables, although extensively used (see Dietsch and 
Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Lozano-Vivas et al., 2001; Lozano-Vivas et al., 2002; Beccalli, 2004; Fiordelisi et al., 2010), does 
not settle the issue of cross-border efficiency comparisons of banks having access to different types and standards of 
technologies in different countries, and that a meta-frontier would be a better solution (Bos and Schmiedel, 2007). 
However, the estimation of the meta-frontier requires a large number of observations per country (e.g. Bos and 
Schmiedel 2007 state: “As a rule of thumb, we include all European countries for which we have at least 200 
observations“). Given the number of banks per country in our sample, we would be forced to estimate joint frontiers for 
combinations of countries. Therefore we privilege the use of a pooled frontier with country-specific environmental 
variables.  
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documentary credits, committed credit lines, other contingent liabilities) as a third output. Although 
oﬀ-balance sheet items are not earnings assets, they do represent an increasing source of income for 
all types of banks and are therefore included in order to avoid understating the total output (Jagtiani 
and Khanthavit, 1996). 
Our environmental variables (EC_FREE, LNMARKET_CAP, PERF_EQ, LNGNI_CAPITA) 
are included to take into account the macroeconomic conditions faced by each bank. The EC_FREE 
is obtained from the Heritage Foundation database. It takes values from 0 to 100: 100 expresses the 
highest forms of economic freedom that should provide an absolute right of property ownership; 
full freedom of movement for labor, capital, and goods; and an absolute absence of coercion or 
constraint of economic liberty. The LNMARKET_CAP is taken from the World Bank database. 
The PERF_EQ comes from the S&P Global Equity Indices taken from Datastream. The 
LNGNI_CAPITA is taken from the World Bank database, ATLAS METHOD. 
The symmetric conditions imply the following restrictions on the second order parameters of the 
function: 
δij = δji  per   1< i < 3 e 1 < j < 3  
γij = γji   per   1< i < 3 e 1 < j < 3      (A. 2) 
In addition, the first grade of homogeneity in the input prices of the cost function TC requires the 
following restrictions on the parameters: 
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The usual input price homogeneity restrictions are imposed on logarithmic price terms. 
Accordingly, TC, P1, and P2 are normalized by the price of capital, P3. 
Table A.1 summarizes the specification of the variables used in the model. Table A.2 reports the 
descriptive statistics for the input, output, netput and the environmental variables in real terms. 
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Table A.1: Variable description  
SYMBOL VARIABLES  DESCRIPTION 
Dependent variable:  
TC Total Cost Labour costs, depreciation of fixed assets, other operating 
expenses, marketing and administrative expenses, interest 
expenses. 
Output:   
Q1  Loans Total amount of loans granted by banks, as expressed in the 
balance sheet 
Q2  Securities Total amount of securities, as expressed in the balance sheet  
Q3  Off-balance sheet items Amount of off-balance sheet items (comprising managed 
securitized assets reported off-balance sheet, other off-balance 
sheet exposure to securitization, guarantees, acceptance and 
documentary credits, committed credit lines, other contingent 
liabilities) as expressed  in the balance sheet  Same definition used 
pre- and post-IFRS adoption.  
Input:   
P1  Labor price Average unit price of labour, given by total personnel expenses 
divided by total assets  
P2 Price of financial capital Interest expenses on total customer deposits 
P3 Price of physical capital Operating expenses – less labor costs and interests – divided by 
total fixed-assets (including both tangible and intangible assets) 
Fixed netput quantities  
E Equity  Common stockholders’ equity 
Environmental variables  
EC_FREE Economic Freedom Overall indicator of economic freedom that encompasses freedom 
and rights on production, distribution, or consumption of goods 
and services (Heritage Foundation database) 
LNMARKET_CAP Logarithm of market 
capitalization  
Natural logarithm of stock market capitalization to - in the country 
in which the bank operates - to Gross Domestic Product  (World 
Bank database) 
PERF_EQ Performance Equity Performance of the equity market in the country proxied by S&P 
Global Equity Indices (Datastream) 
LNGNI_CAPITA Logarithm of Gross 
National Income per 
Capita 
Natural logarithm of Gross National Income per Capita in the 
country in which each individual bank operates (World Bank 
database, ATLAS METHOD) 
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics for the input, output, netput and environmental variables 
This table reports descriptive statistics of the input (P1, P2, P3), output (Q1, Q2, Q3), netput (E) and environmental 
variables (EC_FREE, LNMARKET_CAP, PERF_EQ, LNGNI_CAPITA) used in the estimation of economies of scale. 
Values of output and netput are expressed in thousands of Euro (with the exception of the minimum value of Q3). 
Values are expressed in real terms. 
  Mean Median St. dev. Min Max 
E (Equity) 13,776,221 5,419,350 19,642,740 7,000 128,373,275 
Q1 (Loans) 135,538,512 67,861,000 171,141,744 8,218 1,128,650,689 
Q2 (Securities) 127,231,798 20,756,450 247,648,654 27,500 1,695,177,000 
Q3 (Off Balance Sheet) 50,588,684 11,506,200 95,504,203 1 599,854,200 
P1 (Personnel exp /Total Assets) 0.0095 0.0083 0.007 0.0005 0.0758 
P2 (Interest exp /Deposits) 0.0455 0.0359 0.0567 0.0008 1.2766 
P3 (Other operating exp/Fixed assets) 1.5498 0.9574 2.3534 0.0734 46.4338 
EC_FREE 70.28 70.1 7.1 58.7 82.6 
LNMARKET_CAP 4.17 4.15 0.77 2.45 5.73 
PERF_EQ 3.04 5.16 30.54 -69.94 91.41 
LNGNI_CAPITA 10.54 10.56 0.32 9.67 11.4 
 
